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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  This chapter addresses the role of institutions and institutional reform as a country 
specific competitive enhancing advantage affecting the location of inbound foreign direct 
investment (fdi).  Our focus of interest will be on European transition economies.  Our thesis 
(backed up by a limited amount of econometric and field research) is that the extent and 
quality of a nation’s institutions and its institutional infrastructure (II) is becoming a more 
important component of both (a) its overall productivity and (b) its drawing power to attract 
inbound fdi.  This, in turn, reflects the belief by private corporations (both foreign and home 
based) that the role played by location bound institutions and organizations in 21
st century 
society is becoming an increasingly critical determinant of the successful deployment of their 
own ownership specific, but often mobile, assets. 
  The chapter proceeds in the following way.  First, we shall offer a simple analytical 
framework which might help us to explore the thesis set out above.  Second, we shall identify 
the more significant firm specific strategies and those affecting host transition economies, 
brought about by changes in the world economic and political scenario over the past decade 
or so;  and how these affect the locational pull and push of multinational enterprise (MNE) 
activity.  In particular, we shall examine the evidence of the links between the upgrading of 
the II of the Central and Eastern European region and its propensity to attract inbound fdi (vis 
a vis other areas in the world).  Can we, in fact, identify the kinds of institutional upgrading 
which are likely to exert a greater pull for new fdi?  Third, we shall examine the experiences 
of some 10 Central and Eastern European transition economies.  In particular, we will explore 
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the  proposition  that  any  attempt  to  assess  the  willingness  and  capability  of  particular 
countries to upgrade their II must take account of their unique economic, cultural and social 
characteristics, and their competitive positions vis a vis that of other nations, as it affects the 
kind of inbound MNE activity it is designed to attract. 
 
2.  THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSES 
2.1  Why is II an important locational asset? 
  We start by defining  the more important terms we  use.   We shall take  Douglass 
North’s (1990) concept of institutions as the formal conventions (typically called rules), as 
well  as  the  informal  conventions  (typically  called  standards)  of  society;
2    and  that  of 
individuals and organizations as the entities which devise and implement these institutions.  
These  entities  comprise  each  of  the  stakeholders  (firms,  civil  society,  consumer  groups, 
labour unions and governments) that make up a society.  In North’s view, the purpose of rules 
and conventions (institutions) is to define the rules by which the game (in this case upgrading 
competitiveness and attracting fdi) is played, monitored and enforced.  But the objective of 
the players (the organizations) is to use the institutions in a way which will win the game. 
  By  the  II  we  mean  the  over-arching  environment  in  which  the  institutions  and 
organizations operate.  Taking a recent definition by Mudambi and Navarra (2002, p.638), 
the  II  of  a  country  embraces  its  ‘political  institutions  such  as  regime  type,  the  national 
structure  of  decision  taking  and  the  judicial  system,  economic  institutions,  such  as  the 
structure  of  national  factor  market  and  the  terms  of  access  to  international  factors  of 
production and socio-cultural factors such as informal norms, customs, mores and religions.’ 
  The  key  feature  of  institutions  and  the  II  of  which  they  are  part  is  that  they  are 
location bound extra market instruments designed to facilitate economic activity (including 
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inbound fdi), by reducing the transaction costs of such activity.  Such transaction costs are 
well known to international business scholars.  They represent the ‘hassle’ costs of doing 
business,  and  the  uncertainties  arising  from  possible  opportunism,  moral  hazards  and 
incompleteness in commercial dealings.  They include search, negotiation and enforcement 
costs.  The purpose of an effective and market facilitating II is to reduce these costs, which 
inter alia include inadequate property rights, the absence of a properly regulated banking 
system,  widespread  corruption,  imperfect  or  undeveloped  financial  markets  and  weak 
incentive structures;  and by so doing, both enhance the trust, reciprocity and commitment 
among social and economic agents, and upgrade the competitiveness of firms.
3 
  There has been a good deal of research on how underdeveloped or inefficient II might 
inhibit fdi into host economies;  and to be just as much a deterrent as inadequate economic 
opportunities, high production costs, or inappropriate macro economic or micro management 
policies of governments.
4  Building an efficient and socially acceptable II is likely to be 
particularly challenging in the case of transition economies – unused as they are to a market 
based institutions;  and the speed and extent to which this can be efficiently achieved with 
minimum social disruption, is likely to be a critical factor in influencing the capability of a 
country to adjust to the demands of global capitalism and to attract inbound fdi. 
 
2.2  The analytical framework 
2.2.1  We start by making reference to three exhibits.  The first (Exhibit 1) identifies three 
generic groups of variables which empirical research has shown to influence inbound fdi into 
all  economies.    It  also  indicates  that  the  principal  economic  determinants  (and,  to  some 
                                                
3 For an excellent survey of different types of institution and how their upgrading might enhance economic 
development and the transition process see the chapter by Dennis Rondinelli in this volume.  For an examination 
of the reasons for private enterprise development posed by the transition from state planned to market 
economies in Central and  Eastern Europe see Behrman and Rondinelli (1999).  For an application of the 
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extent, the other two) are influenced by the motives for inbound MNE activity or growth of 
such  activity,  and  also  its  mode  of  entry  (e.g.  by  greenfield  venture  or  by  merger  or 
acquisition (M&A)). 
  As classified, the institutionally related determinants are spread over each of the three 
groups.  Indeed, in a real sense, they are the ‘umbrella’ which affects the efficiency of each of 
the other determinants.  Those which are directly under the control of governments also come 
within the ambit of the policy framework,  which itself, reflects one of the modalities which 
both helps create and monitor the II.  However, the extent and pattern of business facilitating 
variables, notably minimal bureaucracy, and good infrastructural support services, are even 
more critically dependent on the quality of a society’s institutions;  while most of the market 
oriented economic determinants themselves, depend on the underlying incentive structures 
and enforcement procedures. 
  In this exhibit, we have highlighted those determinants which research has suggested 
have become relatively more important in the last decade, due inter alia to technological 
development, globalization and the advent of alliance capitalism (Dunning, 1998);  and how 
these, in turn, have widened the options open to MNEs in their choice of locations, not only 
between countries but within countries. 
  Although the exhibit does not relate the suggested determinants of fdi to particular  
stages of  the  value  chain,  e.g.  pre-production  and post production of the investing 
companies, it may be used in this way.  Nor does it distinguish between particular kinds of 
host or home economies.  We make this point because it is important to acknowledge that the 
significance of the determinants of fdi including the composition and influence of a country’s 
II is likely to be highly context specific. 
   5 
EXHIBIT I  HOST COUNTRY DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
 
Host Country Determinants    Type of FDI by 
motives of TNCs 
Principal economic determinants in host countries 
1.  Policy framework for FDI      ·  Market size and per capital income 
·  Economic, political and social stability      ·  Market growth 
·  Rules regarding entry and operations    A. Market-Seeking  ·  Access to regional and global market 
·  Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates      ·  Country specific consumer preferences 
·  Policies on functioning and structure of markets 
(especially competition and M&A policies) 
    ·  Structure of markets 
·  International agreements on FDI      ·  Land and building costs rents and rates 
·  Privatization policy      ·  Cost of raw materials, components, parts 
·  Trade policy (tariffs and NTBs) and coherence 
of FDI and trade policies 
  B. Resource-seeking  ·  Low-cost unskilled labour 
·  Tax policy (including tax credits)      ·  Availability & cost of skilled labor 
·  Industrial/Regional Policies      ·  Cost of resources and assets listed under B adjusted for 
productivity of labour inputs 
II.  Economic determinants 
 
  C. Efficiency-seeking  ·  Other input costs, e.g. transport and communication costs to 
and from and within host economy 
III Business facilitation      ·  Membership of a regional integration agreement conducive to 
promoting a more cost-effective inter-country division of 
labour 
·  Investment incentives and promotion schemes      ·  Technological, managerial relational and other created assets 
·  Reduced information costs    D. Asset-seeking  ·  Physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power, 
telecommunications) 
·  Social amenities (bilingual schools, quality of 
life, etc.) 
    ·  Macro-innovatory, entrepreneurial & educational 
capacity/environment 
·  Pre- and post-investment services (e.g. one stop 
shopping) 
     
·  Good infrastructure and support services, e.g. 
banking, legal accountancy services 
     
·  Social capital;  economic morality       
·  Region-based cluster and network promotion       
 
Source:  Adapted fro UN (1998) and Dunning (2004)   6 
2.2.2  The second  exhibit (Exhibit 2)  is  adapted from an  interesting  article in a recent 
edition of IBR (Seth, Guisinger, Ford and Phelan, 2002).  Exhibit 2 may be broken down into 
two parts.  The top part of the exhibit identifies the push and pull factors influencing the 
siting of MNE-related activity.
5  Although there is nothing particularly novel in its contents, 
they  do  serve  to  emphasise  that  the  capability  and  willingness  of  countries  –  including 
transition economies – to attract inbound fdi, rests not only on an adequate understanding of 
the  resources,  capabilities,  institutions  and  markets  which comprise  their  unique  location 
competitive advantages, but an appreciation of  the particular siting needs of (different kinds 
of)  MNEs,  and  the  forces  affecting  their  global  production  and  marketing  strategies.  
Countries which are successful in matching their own location bound assets to the ownership 
(but often mobile) advantages of firms (both foreign and domestic), are likely to achieve the 
best results in upgrading or restructuring their indigenous  resources, capabilities and social 
capital to meet their developmental objectives.  The second and lower part of Exhibit 2 sets 
out  these  institutionally  related  variables  under  the  control  of  host  governments  which 
research has suggested are necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for attracting inward fdi.  
The specific measures identified are not very different from those set out in Exhibit 1, and 
many are policy oriented.
6  However, the exhibit does additionally classify these measures by 
the context of the level of action – whether, for example, it is macro, sectorally, firm or 
project  based  –  each  of  which,  to  be  effective,  requires  a  different  institutional  and 
organizational experience and expertise. 
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2.2.3.  The third scheme is an adaptation of one earlier prepared by a British consultancy 
group  which  aims  to  assess  the  special  features  of  fdi  and  its  likely  impact  on  the 
competitiveness of the UK economy.  We have adapted this flow chart in Exhibit 3 to take 
into account some of the specific characteristics of transition economies.  We present it here, 
as it suggests a useful template by which host governments – including those of transition 
economies  –  can  judge  not  only  the  worthwhileness  of  inbound  fdi,  but  also  the 
appropriateness  of  their  economic  policies and  the  adequacy  and  quality  of  the  business 
environment  under  their  jurisdiction.  Again,  we  have  highlighted  the  components  of  the 
schema which (seem to us) to be most clearly dependent on, or reflective of, the indigenous II 
and related support mechanisms. 
  So  much  for  our  analytical  framework.    The  next  part  of  the  paper  looks  at  the 
interaction between the push  and pull factors by considering some of the more important 
changes in (a) the strategies of foreign investors or potential foreign investors, and (b) the 
competitive position and policies of economies, and to do so in the light of changes in the 
global economic and political scenario over the last decade or so. 
 
3.1  The strategies of (foreign) MNEs. 
  All national, or regional governments, in seeking to devise appropriate institutions, 
organizations and policies to upgrade their domestic competitiveness need to be cognizant of 
the evolving strategies of existing and potential foreign investors, as they seek to advance 
their  own  objectives.    For  it  is  in  the  pursuance  of  these  strategies  that  the  locational 
attractions of possible host countries are evaluated. 
   9 
EXHIBIT 3 
ASSESSING THE FEATURES AND IMPACT OF FDI:  A FLOW CHART 
Measuring the Impact of FDI:  Key Flows 
 
Foreign Direct Investment:  Special Features 
Vision & objectives  Product & Markets 
Production processes  Customer/supplier arrangements 
Incentive structures  Financial management/Organization structure 
Labour use/training  Competitive stimulus 
Technology & innovation   
Entrepreneurship   
 
Transmission  Mechanism 
Contractual 
arrangements 
Competitive spur  Enhanced product 
quality 
Training provision 
Visits  Visibility  Lower prices  Labour supply 
Informal liaison  Product availability  Visits  Technological base 





  Competitor Impact    Customer 
Impact 




  Upgrading of 
behavioural 
norms 
Displacement    Technology 
upgrade 
  Human resources 
and skills base 
Efficiency gains          Reduced 
prices 




        Efficiency 
gains 
  Transport 
infrastructure 
Reliability          Logistic 
improvement 
  More competition 
          Skills upgrade    Enforcement 
mechanisms 
          After-sales 
service 





Competitive Advantage of Domestic Firms 
Price  Marketing skills 
Speed of service  Reputation 
Costs  Product design 
Quality  Specialised expertise 
Flair and creativity  Responsiveness to clients. 
 
Improved Performance of Domestic Firms 
Sales  Employment 
Investment  Institutional upgrading 
Productivity  Exports 
Relational capital  Entrepreneurship 
 
N.B. Those items boldly boxed illustrate those which might influence the II of a country. 
Source: J.Dunning – Adapted from study on effects of foreign direct investment in UK manufacturing carried out by PA  
Cambridge Economic Consultants for UK Department of Trade and Industry, October 1995. 
Adverse effects   10 
  Here, we would highlight some strategic changes of the last decade or so, each of 
which is tending to affect the push towards more fdi in transition economies which is now 
occurring.  Some of these are reactive to exogenous changes in the global technological, 
economic and political scenario;  others are reflective of industry or firm specific changes.  
Some  specifically  affect  the  institutional  capacity  of  particular  organizations:    others  the 
broader political economic framework, within which MNEs operate.  A useful examination of 
the specific institutional imperatives of globalization is set out in Rondinelli and Behrman 
(2000).  In particular the authors identify the role of ethical norms, property rights, private 
enterprise, development, support of competition, equality of opportunity and safety nets, and 
democratic  governance.    The  moral challenges of  global  capitalism  is also  the  theme  of 
Dunning (2003).  We present these  briefly and without detailed comment.
7 
  (i)  Due both to the opening up of the global market place – including regional 
integration – and technological advances – particularly in cross border communications -,  
there is a movement by most MNEs to integrate and rationalise their foreign value added 
activities  on  regional  or  global  lines.    Inter  alia  this  means  an  increased  inter-country 
specialisation of products, processes and functions, which, in turn, is leading to more cross 
border transactions goods,  services and assets.  In particular, as far as the European transition 
economies are concerned, this suggests they must view their own location bound competitive 
and comparative advantages, not only from the viewpoint of how far these might advance the 
global or European strategies of MNEs,  - especially their innovation and sourcing options, 
and the extent to which they are prepared to devolve decision taking to their affiliates – but of 
how competitive their II is in relation to that of other similar economies seeking to attract the 
same kind of fdi. 
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  (ii)  In the last decade or so, due again to the added competitive pressures resulting 
from globalization and technological advances, MNEs have increasingly engaged in outward 
fdi to protect or augment their global competitive advantages.
8  Up to the present time, most 
of this asset seeking  fdi (see Exhibit 1) has occurred between the advanced industrialised 
nations, and has taken the form of M&As.
9  However, there are signs that, at least as far as 
the more advanced European transition economies are concerned, the importance of this kind 
of MNE activity is increasing.  Undoubtedly, some fdi in privatization schemes is of an asset 
augmenting nature;  and such investment may well become more important in the future.  The 
point which needs stressing however, is that both the consequences of, and the policy and 
institutional-related variables which may affect such fdi are likely to be very different from 
that of asset exploiting investment (Wesson, 2003). 
  (iii)  Hand in hand with a more centralised control strategy demanded of MNEs 
engaging in integrated international production  has come a decentralization or subsidiarity of 
some  kinds  of  decision  taking,  and  the  rise  in  the  entrepreneurial capabilities  of  MNEs’ 
subsidiaries as creators as well as exploiters of assets.  Julian Birkinshaw and Neil Hood 
(1998), Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke (2001) and Bob Pearce (1999) are among those 
economists who have written extensively on this issue.  But for our purposes, it poses the 
question ‘What institutions, organizations and policies of transition economies are most likely 
to encourage MNEs to sustain, build up and upgrade the value added of their subsidiaries’ 
capabilities - including the higher grade administrative and innovatory functions – in a way 
consistent  with  the  resources  capabilities  and  goals  of  those  economies?    Lessons  from 
Singapore and Hong Kong about the II necessary to attract and sustain regional offices and 
the Bangalore region in India for computer software development are apposite here.
10  This 
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issue  of  subsidiary  development  is  also  related  to  the  geographical  clustering  of 
interdependent activities which, itself, may be thought of as a form of II infrastructure. 
 
  (iv)  Finally, such ‘shocks’ as September 11th, 2001 and related events are having, 
and are likely to continue to have, an affect on the global and regional value adding and 
marketing  strategies  of  MNEs,  For  example, the  impact  of terrorist  activities  directed  to 
countries which are perceived to be either ones which are most likely to be targeted, and/or 
are least sympathetic to the policies of the home governments is likely to be a very negative 
one.  The concept of psychic distance has always been well embedded in IB studies.  A new 
dimension of this  concept – viz. institutional distance - is likely to affect the investment 
portfolios of MNEs as to where they might wish to site their higher value and more sensitive 
activities, e.g. research and development and some forms of subcontracting.  As of the last 
decade or so, however, it would seem that the institutional distance between the European 
transition  economies  and  the  major  source  investing  countries  is  not  increasing  on  this 
account. 
 
3.2.  The opportunities and challenges offered by transition economies. 
  Technological advances and sweeping changes in the global economic scenario have 
no less influenced the country specific opportunities and challenges affecting the pull of fdi; 
and none so much as those within the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  
At the same time, there are responses to these events which to a greater or lesser degree are 
affecting all countries.  Chief among these are the increased competitive pressures among 
firms  brought  about  by  the  new  open-ness  in  the  regional  and/or  global  trading  and 
investment regimes.  This has underlined the need of previously protected economies both to 
upgrade the efficiency of, and to restructure, their production and marketing capabilities in   13 
line with their (perceived) long term comparative advantages.  To promote these objectives, 
and to do so quickly, the technology, management and organisational skills, and markets 
offered by foreign MNEs have been particularly welcomed.  But to attract such assets, host 
countries,  and  particularly  the  transition  economies,  have  had  to  reconfigure  both  their 
macroeconomic and micro-management policies and their II’s in such a way as meets the 
needs of investing corporations.  Bearing in mind the relatively footloose nature of some 
kinds of fdi – particularly that of a market or efficiency kind within a regionally integrated 
area, - what then are the unique location bound advantages - and the II underpinning them - 
which a particular country or region can offer both existing and potential foreign investors 
seeking to advance their own strategic goals? 
  The second critical new development of the past decade, which is influencing  the 
ability of countries to attract inbound fdi – and in particular the role of institution building, 
and  related  government  policies  -  is  the  advent  of  new  means  of  communication,  -  and 
especially the E-commerce and the internet – which, by lowering many spatial transaction 
costs, is having a major effect on the locational preferences of MNEs.
11  This is seen to be 
particularly  the  case  with  respect  to  their  sourcing  of  standardised,  but  relatively  labor 
intensive, goods and services.  And it is these areas (e.g. motor vehicle components, garment 
manufacturing, call centres) in which the transition economies, along with other countries at 
the intermediate stages of their investment development paths (Dunning and Narula 1996), 
have a comparative advantage.  At the same time, viewed from a developmental perspective, 
it  is  important  that  the  transition  economies  learn  from  the  experience  of  such  Asian 
economies as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan
12 of the need to continually restructure and 
upgrade their location specific endowments (especially their institution’s human capital and 
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innovatory capacity);  and in so doing not only attract a better quality of fdi, but help their 
own indigenous firms to become outward foreign investors.
13 
  A  third  element  of  the  changing  characteristics  of  country-specific  advantages 
concerns  the  increasing  attention  now  being  paid  to  sub-national  clusters  of  economic 
activities, particularly in large and medium size economies.  Here the work of Michael Porter 
(1998) and Michael Enright (2002) is particularly germane.  It is quite clear from the research 
into the intra-national location strategies of both domestic and foreign firms, that the extent 
and content of the II of particular regions or districts – and especially the incentive structures, 
the quality of educational institutions, the communications infrastructure, the entrepreneurial 
culture, social capital,  and the provision of industrial and science parks – is one of the most 
powerful  pull  factors  they  can  offer.    This  is  particularly  likely  to  be  so  when  such 
inducements are ‘tailor made’ to the kind of fdi they are seeking to attract. 
  Clearly, there are very specific opportunities and challenges now being faced by the 
ex-Communist countries.  None is more relevant than those arising from the  change in the 
ownership of productive assets demanded by the market economy;  and the consequential 
need to drastically lower the transaction and coordination costs of doing business.  This, 
perhaps more than anything else, requires a wholesale reconfiguration of the organizational 
and economic management of the transition economies.  We have already referred to some of 
these, and there is a substantial literature on the subject (see especially Meyer 2001a,b).  For 
now, however, we are interested in seeing how important the various competitive enhancing 
measures  just  described  have  been    in  affecting  recent  fdi  inflows  into  the  transition 
economies. 
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4.  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
  Let us then turn to review the empirical evidence of the significance of institutional 
and policy related variables on the ‘pull’ factors influencing the location of fdi – both in 
European transition economies taken as a grou, and within particular transition economies? 
  Up to now the number of research studies so far conducted fall into two main groups.  
First  there  are  the  statistical  and  econometric  exercises  which  seek  to  quantify  the 
relationship between fdi flows (or changes in the stock of fdi) and selection of explanatory, 
including institutionally related, variables. These normally use published data, largely from 
official sources such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
OECD and the UN.  Second, there are the field surveys which are primarily designed to 
extract the opinion of existing and/or potential foreign investors about the location specific 
opportunities and challenges offered by the transition economies;  and to rank in importance 
(what  they  perceive to be)  the  critical  determinants  of  recent  past, and  likely  future, fdi 
commitments. 
  In the paragraphs which follow, we shall focus on two recent empirical exercises, 
both of which are comprehensive in scope and detail, in as much as they draw heavily on data 
and opinions used in previous studies. 
 
4.1  The statistical and econometric exercises use mainly multivariate regressions to assess 
the significance of either a proxy for institutions as a whole, or particular institutional-related 
variables as determinants of fdi flows.  Both time series and cross sectional studies, or a 
combination of the two using panel data, are commonly deployed.  For the purposes of this 
paper, we detail just one of the most recent and, at the time of writing, unpublished studies 
(Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004)).  This draws upon a panel of information for the years 
1994-8  compiled  by  the  major  source  investing  countries  (the  EU,  US,  Japan,  Korea,   16 
Switzerland in respect of fdi in 10 transition economies seeking accession to the EU, plus 
Russia and the Ukraine).
14 
  As to the general impact, it was found that, after eliminating the effects of a number 
of control variables such as market size, cultural, linguistic and geographic distance and labor 
costs, there was a positive but (at 6%) not a highly significant relationship between the level 
of inbound fdi and a composite index of II.
15  
  Of the specific II variables, both change of ownership (in the form of privatisation) 
and  private  sector  development  were  seen  to  be  positively,  though  not  significantly, 
correlated to fdi flows, again once control variables were taken into account.  In particular, 
the  creation  of  new  markets,  including  those  relating  to  fdi  and  cross  border  alliance 
formation,  were  shown  to  reduce  transaction  costs  associated  with  uncertainty  and 
bureaucratic opportunism.  Rather more significantly, the quality and transparency of the 
financial sector and banking reform was seen to be significantly correlated with fdi flows;  
but non-bank institutional upgrading, e.g. with respect to capital markets appeared to be less 
so.    However,  the  liberalization  of  domestic  markets,  the  strengthening  of  competition 
policies and a movement towards a more open trading regime was seen to have had a strong 
positive affect, as was that of the upgrading of the legal system.  One further conclusion of 
this  study was that foreign investors  appeared to be  more  concerned with the  quality of 
formal institutions than they were with informal ones. 
  These results all point to the importance of institution building as a necessary pre-
requisite for fdi.  They confirm and extend those of earlier studies such as those by Lansbury, 
Pain and Smidkova (1996), the E.I.U. (2001), Holland, Sass, Benacek and Gronicki (2000) 
                                                
14 These are, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
15 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development regularly compiles such an index for each of the 
transition economies.  See e.g. EBRD (2000).   17 
and Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2000).
16  The E.I.U. statistical exercise, based on fdi flows into 
27  Central  and  East  European  countries  between  1996  and  2000,  found  that  among  the 
significant  explanatory  variables,  the  quality  of  the  business  environment  and  the 
privatization variable were both highly significant, along with market size, wage costs and a 
natural resource variable (E.I.U. 2002).
17  This study also suggested that preparation for their 
(proposed) accession to the EU and all this implied is compelling countries to upgrade their 
II, and, by so doing, reduce both domestic and intra-European transaction and coordinating 
costs.  However, the case of Greece, which did not sufficiently engage in institutional and 
policy  reform,  at  the  time  of  her  entry  into  the  EC  shows  that  accession  does  not 
automatically result in increased fdi flows (Kekic, 2002). 
  One other recently completed study of fdi in some 13 Central and Eastern European 
economies between 1990 and 1999 is also worthy of note.  Using panel data and various 
statistical models Grosse and Trevino (2003) found that while the role of institution building 
tended to follow similar patterns in the economies studied to that in other emerging markets, 
it tended to play a rather more significant role.  In particular, the authors noted the right kind 
of bilateral investment treaties, the degree of enterprise reform, repatriation rules, and the 
reduction of the level of government corruption were particular pulls in attracting fdi. 
 
4.2  Most surveys of business opinion tend to confine themselves to identifying (a) the 
strength or weakness of different locational determinants (usually on a Likert Scale) and 
                                                
16 A recently published study on fdi in Latin America also concluded that “privatization was the most highly 
significant independent variable to help explain inward FDI in Latin America” (Trevino, Daniels, Aberlaez and 
Upadhyaya (2002). [Also significantly positively related to fdi inflows was the  liberalization of capital 
markets].  The methodology of this study is of particular interest as the authors’ measure of privatization 
subtracted out fdi in the privatized sector.  The results then implied that a change of ownership as an 
institutional reform does much more than simply attracting  fdi to a previously closed sector. 
17 According to the model “market-size, the quality of the overall business environment, wage costs, natural 
resource endowments and privatisation methods statistically explain almost the entire inter-country variation in 
FDI receipts in the region in 1996-2000, (E.I.U. 2002, p.87).   18 
changes in these, and  (b) how any particular determinant differs in its perceived significance 
across countries. 
  Let us illustrate from just one major annual survey undertaken by the E.I.U. which 
attempts to calculate a Business Environment Index (BEI) for some 60 countries.  This index 
is essentially a composite of data and opinions culled from other published sources,
18 and a 
series  of business surveys conducted  by the E.I.U itself.  The index is  derived from  the 
rankings obtained for 10 broad determinants of competitiveness which then are further sub-
divided  into  70  particular  components.
19    The  most  recently  compiled  nformation  was 
collected for two time periods.  The first was for the years 1998-2002 and the second 2003-7 
(EIU 2003). 
  We consider two sets of data.  The first are those which relate to the rankings assigned 
to  some specific II all countries – and  how they compared with those  given  to Western 
Europe and  Latin America.
20 and policy related determinants for  the  European transition 
economies as a whole;  The second classifies the 10 economies into two groups and compares 
the significance of II related assets with more traditional location specific variables.
21 covered 
by the survey.  Table 1 sets out scores – on a range of 1 – 5, 5 being the most conducive to 
competitiveness and 1 the least conducive – for a selection of the 70 variables which best 
relate to II and policy-related variables.  These data show:- 
                                                
18 As described by E.I.U.(2002) p.134.  Regrettably this report does not identify the number of firms completing 
the fourteen page Business Rankings Questionnaire the answers to which formed an important part of the BEI.. 
19 These could quite readily be reclassified using the seven kinds of institutions identified by Denis Rondinelli 
(see Chapter ….of this volume).  These are institutions of economic adjustment and stabilization, e.g. macro 
economic adjustment policies;  institutions strengthening economic motivation, e.g. fdi policies, labor markets;  
institutions of private property protection;  institutions promoting freedom of enterprise, e.g. political 
liberalization, quality of financial regulatory system; institutions of rule setting and societal guidance, e.g. 
effectiveness and fairness of legal system, policies for controlling corruption, quality of bureaucracy;  
institutions promoting competition, e.g. trade and investment, liberalization, competition policy, and institutions 
promoting social equity and access to opportunity. 
 
20 As an example of a developing region. 
21 Further details on each of the individual 10 countries are presented as an Appendix to this chapter.   19 
  (i)    For  1998-2002,  the  overall  BEI  score  for  the  transition  economies  was  2.7 
compared  with  that  of  3.8  for  Western  Europe,  2.9  for  Latin  America,  and  3.4  for  all 
countries.  Between 2003 and 2007, the corresponding scores are expected to rise to 3.1, 4.0, 
3.1 and 3.5 respectively with the East European countries recording the greatest absolute 
percentage increase. 
  (ii)  The scores assigned to the II variables for East European countries were, on 
average, ranked lower than the non II variables;  and also to the scores of the II proxies 
assigned to Western European and Latin American countries.  Those II variables ranked the 
lowest included the protection of intellectual property rights, the promotion of competition, 
stock market capitalisation, the transparency of the legal system, corruption, the quality of the 
financial regulatory system, bureaucracy, the reliability of the telecommunication network, 
the infrastructure for retail and wholesale distribution, access to finance for investment, and 
the consistency and fairness of the tax system. 
  Looking forward to 2003-7, the scores of each of these variables was expected to rise 
– and again proportionately more so in Central and Eastern Europe than elsewhere. 
  (iii)  Turning now to the business attitudes towards more policy related variables, 
other data published by the EIU (not presented here) reveal that both the macro and micro 
management policies  - taken as a group - were ranked more favourably than were the II 
variables  (EIU,  2003).    More  especially  labor  related  policies,  the  tax  burden  and  the 
corporate tax rate were three of the policy variables in which Central and Eastern Europe was 
perceived  to  have  comparative  locational  advantage  vis  a  vis  Western  Europe  and  Latin 
America.  The main exceptions were competition and anti-corruption policies.  However, 
taken  as  a  whole, the policy scores were lower than in all other parts of the world except the    
   20
TABLE 1 
INDICATOR SCORES FOR SELECTED INSTITUTION-RELATED VARIABLES IN THE EIU BUSINESS TANKING MODE (i) 
1998-2002, (ii) 2003-7 
 
      1988 - 2002      2003-7     














(A) OVERALL BEI SCORE  3.4  2.7  3.8  2.9  3.5  3.1  4.0  3.6 
(B) POLITICAL /SOCIAL                 
·  Risk of social unrest  3.4  3.0  4.5  2.6  3.5  3.2  4.5  2.4 
·  Government policy 
towards business 
3.6  3.2  3.9  3.5  3.6  3.3  3.9  3.5 
·  Quality of bureaucracy  3.0  1.9  3.5  2.9  3.1  2.2  3.9  2.8 
·  Effectiveness and fairness 
of legal system 
2.9  1.9  4.1  2.5  3.1  2.6  4.2  2.6 
·  Corruption  2.9  2.0  3.9  2.4  3.0  2.1  4.1  2.4 
·  Distortions arising from 
lobbying from special 
interest groups 
2.8  2.1  3.6  2.8  3.0  2.4  3.8  3.0 
·  Distortions arising from 
state/ownership or control 
3.2  2.8  4.1  2.9  3.5  3.4  4.2  3.4 
 
·  Risk of expropriation of 
foreign assets 
4.3  3.8  4.9  4.1  4.3  3.8  4.9  4.1 
   21
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
      1998-2002      2003-7     















(C) ECONOMIC                 
·  Policies towards foreign 
capital 
3.6  33.4  4.1  3.9  3.9  3.7  4.4  3.8 
·  Quality of financial 
regulatory system 
3.1  2.4  3.9  2.8  3.6  3.0  4.6  3.5 
·  Consistency/fairness of tax 
system 
3.1  2.0  3.9  2.5  3.4  2.7  4.2  2.6 
·  Stockmarket capitalism  2.9  1.7  4.2  2.3  3.2  2.0  4.6  2.4 
·  Access to finance for 
investment 
3.3  2.2  4.4  2.5  3.5  2.5  4.5  2.6 
·  Quality of telecoms network  3.1  1.9  4.2  2.9  3.6  2.7  4.6  3.3 
·  Infrastructure for distribution  3.1  1.8  4.2  2.4  3.5  2.7  4.5  2.9 
·  Degree to which private 
property rights are protected 
3.9  3.1  4.8  3.1  4.0  3.5  4.9  3.1 
·  Intellectual property right 
protection 
3.2  2.2  4.4  3.1  3.5  2.9  4.6  2.8 
·  Promotion of competition  2.9  1.9  3.6  2.8  3.4  2.9  4.0  2.9 
·  Tariff and monetary 
protection 
3.5  3.2  3.9  3.0  3.7  3.6  4.0  3.4   22 
Middle East.
22  Again, in the 2003-7 period the rankings for each of these variables in Central 
and Eastern Europe are expected to improve, both absolutely and relatively to those in other 
regions. 
  Table 2 sets out some further details for the 10 European transitional economies for 
which the E.I.U. published data.  For each country, scores of 1 – 10 were assigned to each of 
the 10 categories of the BEI for 1998 - 2001 and 2003 - 7.  Based on their GDPs per head,
23 
we classified these countries into two groups.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia comprised the first group:  Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russia and 
the Ukraine the second.  We also added India and China for purposes of comparison. 
  We might highlight three main points from this table, and also from Table 3 which 
gives average scores for the II and other variables for each of the 10 countries. 
  i)  For the more advanced TEs, the scores for the institution-related categories
24 
were slightly above those of the other - including policy related  - categories in the 1998-2002 
period.  For the less advanced TEs, the II variables were ranked quite a bit lower than the 
other variables.  Broadly the same picture emerged in respect of the 2003-7 scores. 
  (ii)  There is a strong suggestion that, as development proceeds, the scores  likely 
to be assigned to the institution-related variables not only rise, but rise relative to that of the 
other categories.  Particular examples, as shown in Table 2,  include the quality of institutions 
promoting private enterprise, the political environment  and financing (mostly one suspects 
the quality  of the financial regulatory system and distortion (or  the  absence  of same) in 
financial markets).  Again, as Table 3 shows, the most impressive II upgrading is predicted to 
occur in the less developed TEs especially in Azerbaijan, Russia and the Ukraine. 
 
                                                
22 These scores were not broken down for each country for each of 70 individual items. 
23 Calculated in $ at PPP. 
24 We have had to be rather arbitrary in classifying the components, as, in some cases, policy and institution-
related variables were difficult to distinguish from each other.   23
TABLE 2 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SCORESX FROR TRANSITION ECONOMIES (TEs) INDIA AND CHINA (i) 1998-2002, (ii) 2003-7 
 


































Political environment  6.5  4.0  5.5  4.5  7.0  4.6  5.3  4.3 
Political stability  7.8  5.4  6.4  5.5  8.0  5.7  5.5  4.6 
Political input  5.5  2.9  4.8  3.6  6.2  3.7  5.1  4.0 
Policy towards private 
enterprises and competition 
6.0  3.5  4.4  3.3  7.4  4.6  5.8  4.9 
Policy towards foreign direct 
investment 
8.2  5.0  5.5  6.1  8.3  5.5  6.6  7.2 
Taxes  5.0  3.9  5.7  5.1  6.1  5.0  6.9  5.2 
Financing  6.6  3.4  4.4  3.6  7.0  4.9  5.5  5.5 
Infrastructure  5.4  4.1  2.4  2.6  6.4  4.9  3.7  3.9 
B.  OTHER 
DETERMINANTS 
               
Macroeconomic environment  6.5  6.1  8.1  9.7  7.6  7.5  7.4  9.7 
Market opportunities  4.9  4.7  6.4  8.4  5.3  5.0  7.3  8.3 
Foreign trade and exchange   
controls 
8.0  5.7  4.9  4.9  8.8  7.2  7.8  7.8 
The labor market  6.7  6.0  5.4  5.3  6.8  6.4  6.2  6.1 
Overall score  6.4  4.4  5.3  5.4  7.1  5.6  6.2  6.3 
 
1GDP per capita (US$ PPP) 2002.  
2 Estimated GDP per capita (US$ PPP) 2007. 
Source: EIU (2003): Scores range from 1-10, a score of 10 being perceived as the best for business.   24
TABLE 3 BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT RANKINGS, FDI PER CAPITA AND GDP PER CAPITA FOR 10 TRANSITION  
ECONOMIES 1998-2002 AND 2003-7 
 























6.5  6.7  6.2    548  11,294  7.3  7.6  6.9  611  14,904 
Hungary  6.7  6.9  6.3    328    8,858  7.3  7.5  6.8  372  12,026 
Poland  6.4  6.5  6.1    178    7,664  7.0  7.2  6.8  183  9,786 
Slovakia  5.8  5.9  5.6    312    8,572  6.6  6.7  6.6  367  11,386 




                   
Azerbaijan  4.4  3.5  5.9    72    1,548  5.3  4.7  6.4  176  2,512 
Bulgaria  5.4  5.4  5.4    89    5,240  6.3  6.3  6.2  105  7374 
Kazakhstan  4.8  4.4  5.8    118    4,056  5.2  4.6  6.5  151  6,644 
Romania  4.6  4.9  4.1    60    4,748  5.7  5.7  5.6  79  6,508 
Russia  4.5  4.0  5.7    19    4,956  6.0  5.2  7.5  69  6,948 
Ukraine  4.1  3.5  4.7    14    2,456  5.2  4.7  6.1  27  3,554 
ALL LATE    4.3  5.3    62    3,834  5.6  5.2  6.4  101  5,590 
ALL TES                     
 
Key to Table 3. 
BER = Business Environment Rankings        FDI per capita ($) Inbound FDI flows per capita averaged over two five year  
Inst = II variables              periods (viz 1998-02 and 2003-07). 
Other = Other variables in BER          GDP per capita ($) GDP per capita at purchasing power parity averaged over 
                  two five year periods (viz. 1998-02 and 2003-07). 
   25 
  (iii)  Looking  at  the  comparative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  institutional-
related categories for the 10 countries identified, we see that in the1998-2002 period, the 
perceived strengths of the less developed TE countries were their political stability, their 
policies  towards  fdi;  and  their  weaknesses  a  high  level  of    bureaucracy,  corruption, 
distortions  arising  from  lobbying  by  special  interest  groups,  political  effectiveness  and 
organizational infrastructure.  For the more advanced TEs  (which currently receive the great 
bulk of inbound fdi), the perceived strengths were their attitudes towards fdi and exchange 
controls,  political  stability  and  the  macro-economic  environment,  improved  corporate 
governance  and  the  regulatory  framework;    and  their  weaknesses,  the  consistency  and 
fairness of the tax system, communications infrastructure, unnecessary bureaucracy, and lack 
of transparency in public administration.   
Table 2 also shows the relative strengths and weaknesses of two Asian economies 
undergoing  significant  structural  transformation.    In  India’s  case,  its  main  strength  was 
perceived to lie in its macroeconomic environment and political stability, and its weaknesses 
in  its  transport  and  power  infrastructure,  and  in  its  banking  and  financial  regulatory 
mechanisms.  In China’s case there were similar strengths and weaknesses;
25  though China’s 
policy towards private enterprise was thought to be less conducive to inbound fdi than that of 
India.
26 
  Finally in Table 3, we relate the business environment ranking of the 10 TEs to their 
GDP per capita and their inbound fdi per capita.  The data show that, not only is there an 
extremely close positive correlation between the II scores for FDI per capita and GDP per 
capita in both 1998-2002 and 2003–2007, but that this correlation is significantly higher than 
in the case of the other, i.e. non II variables.  The lesson here seems to be that at a certain 
                                                
25 China’s main comparative advantage rested on its market opportunities and macroeconomic environment.  In 
both cases China was ranked second of the 60 countries covered by the EIU survey. 
26 Again, it is difficult to generalise for large economies like India and China as there are large differences in the 
institutional environment between the major industrial conurbations and the rest of the countries.   26 
GDP per capita level the relative importance of the II as a variable influencing fdi inflows 
decreases. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
  This chapter has sought to assess the significance of institutional infrastructure and 
development as a determinant of fdi flows into the European transition economies.  It began 
by examining the critical role of the institutional environment (comprising both institutions 
and the strategies and policies of organizations relating to these institutions) in reducing the 
transaction costs  of  both  domestic  and cross  border  business  activity.   It  then  set  up  an 
analytical framework identifying the determinants of fdi, how these had changed over recent 
years,  and  which  were  likely  to  be  the  most  important  from  the  viewpoint  of  transition 
economies. 
  Section 3 of the chapter then went on to describe the reconfiguration of the main push 
factors  affecting  the  current  strategy  and  behaviour  of  MNEs  brought  about  by  recent 
changes in the global economy;  and also the main pull factors determining the location 
specific advantages of countries and regions wishing to attract the resources and capabilities 
which  foreign  investors  were  perceived  to  possess.    This  section  concluded  with  some 
observations as to the type of asset based advantages transition economies should strive to 
develop. 
  Section 4 then turned to consider the results of two major empirical exercises on the 
particular role of II as a determinant of fdi flows into transition economies.  The econometric 
study showed that, after allowing for control variables, the quality of the II was positively, 
and for some kinds of institutions, significantly related to fdi flows.  The field study indicated 
that (proxies for) the quality of II in the less advanced transition economies were generally 
thought to be less conducive to fdi than those possessed by other economies, and also of the   27 
non II determinants of fdi.  However, it was generally expected that, over the period 2003-7, 
the quality of II of both groups of transition economies would improve relative to that of 
other economies, and, that, in consequence, they would gain an increasing share of inbound 
fdi.
27  Other data also suggest that the prospects of accession to the EC, and the benefits 
likely to be  conferred, is becoming an important inducement to many (if not all) transition 
economies to upgrade their II.  A final part of this chapter also made some comparisons and 
contrasts  between  the competitive  advantages  (and  disadvantages)  of  European  transition 
economies and that of India and China as a location for inbound MNE activity. 
 
   
                                                
27 The EIU’s prediction is that the share of the world’s inbound fdi stock directed to the 10 Central and Eastern 
European economies would increase from 2.2% in 2000 to 3.2% in 2007 (EIU 2003, p. 135/6).   28 
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APPENDIX 1 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT RANKINGS FOR 10 TRANSITION ECONOMIES FOR (A) 1998-02 AND (B) 2003-07 
 




PE  PS  PE  PPE  FDI  FT/
E 
T  F  LM  I  MACRO  MO  FT/
E 
T  LM  OVER 
ALL 
Czech Republic  6.9  8.75  5.5  6.1  8.9  8.3  4.5  6.3  6.4  6.0  7.6  4.5  8.3  4.5  6.4  6.5 
Hungary  6.5  7.3  5.9  6.6  8.9  8.3  5.9  7.0  7.1  5.5  6.1  5.5  8.3  5.7  7.1  6.7 
Poland  6.9  8.2  5.9  6.1  8.3  7.2  4.8  7.0  6.2  5.1  6.4  6.0  7.2  4.8  6.2  6.4 
Slovakia  5.7  6.9  4.8  5.2  6.6  8.3  4.6  5.9  6.8  5.1  6.0  3.7  8.3  4.6  6.8  5.8 




                               
Azerbaijan  2.8  3.3  2.5  2.7  4.4  5.5  3.7  2.1  5.9  3.3  7.6  5.4  5.5  3.7  5.9  4.4 
Bulgaria  5.3  6.9  4.0  4.9  6.6  6.6  4.4  4.0  5.4  5.3  6.9  3.4  6.6  4.4  6.4  5.4 
Kazakhstan  4.1  5.5  2.9  3.5  4.9  6.1  3.8  4.0  6.0  3.7  8.3  6.1  6.1  3.8  6.0  4.8 
Romania  5.3  6.9  4.0  4.1  6.1  5.5  4.2  4.0  5.9  4.4  2.9  3.6  5.5  4.2  5.9  4.6 
Russia  3.0  4.2  2.1  3.3  3.3  6.1  4.0  3.6  6.6  4.2  4.8  6.6  6.1  4.0  6.6  4.5 
Ukraine  3.7  5.5  2.1  2.7  4.4  4.4  3.2  2.9  6.0  3.9  6.3  3.3  4.4  3.2  6.0  4.1 
ALL LATES  4.0  5.4  2.9  3.5  5.0  5.7  3.9  3.4  6.0  4.1  6.1  4.7  5.7  3.9  6.0  4.6 
ALL TES  5.0  6.4  3.9  4.5  6.3  6.6  4.3  4.7  5.0  4.6  6.3  4.8  6.6  4.3  6.2  5.3 
 
Source:  EIU (2003):  Scores range from 1-10, a score of 10 being perceived as the best for business.  34
 
 




PE  PS  PE  PPE  FDI  FT/
E 
T  F  LM  I  MACR.  MO  FT/
E 
T  LM  OVER 
ALL 
Czech Republic  7.5  8.7  6.6  7.8  8.9  8.9  5.4  7.4  6.9  6.9  8.1  5.4  8.9  5.4  6.9  7.3 
Hungary  6.9  7.8  6.3  7.8  8.9  8.9  6.6  7.4  7.1  6.6  6.9  5.6  8.9  6.6  7.12  7.3 
Poland  7.1  8.2  6.3  7.2  8.3  8.3  6.3  7.4  6.4  6.0  7.4  6.0  8.3  6.3  6.4  7.0 
Slovakia  6.3  7.3  5.5  6.9  7.2  8.9  6.0  5.9  6.9  6.0  8.1  4.2  8.9  6.0  6.9  6.6 




                               
Azerbaijan  3.5  3.7  3.3  3.8  5.5  7.2  5.5  4.0  5.5  4.6  7.6  5.7  7.2  5.5  5.9  5.3 
Bulgaria  5.9  7.3  4.8  6.3  7.2  7.8  5.6  5.5  6.7  6.2  7.8  3.9  7.8  5.6  6.7  6.3 
Kazakhstan  4.1  5.5  2.9  4.1  4.4  7.2  3.2  4.8  6.0  4.2  8.3  6.1  7.2  3.2  6.0  5.2 
Romania  5.5  6.9  4.4  5.5  6.6  7.8  5.2  5.1  6.3  4.8  5.3  4.6  7.8  5.2  6.3  5.7 
Russia  4.3  5.1  3.6  4.9  4.4  7.2  5.5  5.1  7.2  5.1  7.4  4.9  7.2  5.5  7.2  6.0 
Ukraine  4.1  5.5  2.9  3.8  4.9  6.1  4.7  4.8  6.4  4.6  8.3  4.5  6.1  4.7  6.4  5.2 
ALL LATES  4.6  5.7  3.7  4.6  5.5  7.2  5.0  4.9  6.4  4.9  7.5  5.0  7.2  5.0  6.4  5.6 
ALL TES                                 
 
Key to notations:  PE = Political environment:  PS = Political Stability:  PI – Political Impact:  PPE = Policy towards private enterprise and 
competition:  FDI = Policy towards foreign direct investment:  FT/E = Foreign trade and exchange control: T = Taxes: F = Financing: LM = 
Labor Market:  I = Infrastructure: Macr. = Macroeconomic environment:  MO = Market opportunities. 
NB. Some variables are a mixture between those which are institutionally related & those more generally affecting business environment. For 
these cases we have included them in both groups of variables. 
 
 